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ABSTRACT
Agricultural economists are appropriately concerned about their profession’s contributions to policy
decisions. An examination of alternative approaches to transforming policy analyses is in order.
There are opportunities to (a) focus on income and wealth distribution, (b) give attention to the public
as a primary client, (c) avoid advocacy, and (d) adjust institutions in ways that encourage participation
in policy analyses including the development of data systems.
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O’Brien, Conley, and Dicks each challenge the pro-
fession to contribute more effectively to public
policy decisions. O’Brien observes that economic
analyses did not address several questions related
to 1995–96 farm legislation, all of which may have
been important to legislative decisions, Conley
concludes that the Freedom to Farm Bill represents
an economist’s solution, although accomplished
without economists. Finally, Dicks argues that ag-
ricultural economists have not focused sufficiently
on equity questions, like regional effects of policy.
It is well that all professions periodically ad-
dress the appropriateness of their work. Thus, I
congratulate the authors for focusing our attention
on the work of agricultural economists. The papers
lead me, in turn, to raise four questions:
(1) Might our professional dialogue be enhanced
by focusing on “income and wealth distribu-
tion” instead of “equity”?
(2) Would a renewed emphasis on the public as a
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(3)
(4)
primary client contribute to more enlightened
policies?
Is it appropriate for publicly supported agricul-
tural economists to advocate particular policy
approaches?
Could new public institutional arrangements
enhance the quality of policy analysis and its
understanding by the public?
Income and Wealth Distribution or
Equity as a Focus
The meaning of the word “equity” is, in my judg-
ment, not widely understood. Most people who use
the word equity probably have a clear concept in
mind as to what it means, The difficulty is that oth-
ers do not necessarily attach the same meaning to
the word. The dictionary I consulted gives this
definition: “The state, ideal, or quality of being just,
impartial, and fair. , . something that isjust, impar-
tial, or fair.” I suggest that it is inappropriate to
expect agricultural economists to appraise the
justness, impartiality, or fairness of legislative deci-
sions and options within the range in which policy
options are usually considered. But the public, in
my mind, can reasonably expect agricultural econ-
omists to provide insights about the income and
wealth distribution effects of legislative decisions,
and they (the public), when informed, can appraiseSchertz: Agricultural Policy Analysis: Discussion 53
whether the effects are equitable and fair or inequi-
table and unfair.
I accept Dicks’ suggestion that regional effects
of policy should be addressed by agricultural econ-
omists. But the inequality of income and wealth
among us and the interaction of this phenomenon
with political agendas suggest to me that regional
distribution questions represent only one kind of
many distribution-related questions that econo-
mists might usefully encompass in their work. To
be sure, it is important to consider whether farm
legislation gives more, for example, to Illinois corn
producers and related land owners than to wheat
growers in Oklahoma or Ohio, or to sugar produc-
ers in North Dakota. But such a focus is insufficient
in my judgment.
Also, consideration needs to be given to the
scope of distribution-oriented analyses. One of the
most critical considerations is whether the analysis
implies a norm. Suppose an analysis was focused
on the income and wealth distribution effects of
one of the major farm bill proposals, Would one
measure how the income and wealth distributions
associated with the proposal would compare to the
distributions with a continuation of 1995 policies?
An alternative would be to compare the prospective
distributions associated with the proposal with
what would be the distributions without any direct
government intervention in farm commodity mar-
kets. I support the notion that both comparisons
should be displayed. The current federal govern-
ment approach of measuring change from a “con-
tinuation of current policy” baseline biases the ac-
tivity toward continuation of current policy, or so it
seems to me.
Another point is vitally important. The endorse-
ment of the profession giving attention to income
and wealth distribution is not meant to detract from
the tremendous importance of estimating aggregate
variables. Such work needs to continue to be of the
highest quality. If it were not, both the aggregate
and the distribution activities of the profession
would evolve into irrelevant y.
My differences with Dicks may be largely se-
mantic, and there may be basically no disparity be-
tween us on these points. But as an ancient philoso-
pher once said, “If you are to argue with me, first
define your terms.” Because of the possible ambi-
guity of the meaning of the word equity and ques-
tions about economists being able to appraise fair-
ness, I prefer words whose meanings are more
intuitive,
Some people would argue that since economists
have no special talent for appraising whether partic-
ular decisions are equitable, they should ignore in-
come and wealth distribution effects. I disagree.
For example, public decision making could benefit
greatly if agricultural economists regularly esti-
mated direct and indirect transfers associated with
public programs (farm and otherwise) according to
income and wealth status of recipients, as well as
those who provide the benefits, Note that this sen-
tence encompasses not only a focus on the transfers
that are incidental to the policy, but also the income
and wealth status of those who benefit and pay. I
embrace the notion that there is a need for greater
attention to income and wealth distribution effects
(including, but not limited to, regional effects) of
legislative decisions. And then, if the profession de-
velops the skill to appraise the fairness of these dis-
tributions, well and good, However, for now I am
prepared to let the voters decide what is fair or
unfair.
The Public as a Primary Client
Professionally we have come to attribute special
charm to those among us to whom legislators listen.
The notion is that these individuals have special op-
portunities to influence legislation. While we might
hope that influencing public policy were so simple,
I have come to conclude that legislative decisions
are much more complex. Many considerations,
other than what agricultural economists say, affect
the crafting of legislation and how legislators vote.
On the other hand, agricultural economists have
much to contribute to legislative decision making.
It is quite appropriate for agricultural economists to
be responsive to perceived demands of legislators.
However, the significance of legislators as primary
clients can be overemphasized. Our efforts in pur-
suit of enlightened public policy may be served by
giving at least equal attention to informing the pub-
lic—for the public ultimately controls the legis-
lators.
Imagine a profession that emphasized a con-
tinual and close examination of policy proposals
and decisions with the objective of vigorously in-
forming legislators and the public—agricultural
and nonagricultural—of the effects of current poli-54 Journal ofAgricultural and Applied Economics, July 1996
ties on the distributions of income and wealth, and
of the potential effects of these prospective policy
proposals and decisions on the distribution of in-
comes and wealth.
The suggestion that attention be given to in-
forming the public is derived from several observa-
tions. I tend to think that we may be overly con-
cerned about what legislators want to know. In
addition, we may be overly optimistic about how
they would vote if they knew what we know. Un-
doubtedly, there are many legislators who want to
pass laws which generate effects that are “fair,” to
use a word akin to equity. But many legislators
must spend most of their time trying to discover the
combinations that will enhance their election pros-
pects. In addition, I tend to think that the legisla-
tors perceive remarkably well the income distribu-
tion effects of their decisions on their constituents.
Surely, the leaders of special-interest groups do.
That is why they are willing to spend their money
in attempting to influence the decisions. Unfortu-
nately, too many who ultimately pay for these poli-
cies when they pay their income tax, or purchase
the “stick-up” commodities in the form of groceries
or gasoline, do not understand the distribution ef-
fects of policies.
By the public, I mean everyone-not just pro-
ducers and those with substantial financial invest-
ments in farming and related businesses (although
they are also included). An expansive effort to
inform the public would require the most innova-
tive communication techniques available and the
involvement of the most skilled among us. The ef-
fective inclusion of the public would have two sig-
nificant effects on our professional conduct. First,
in such an environment it would be imperative to
deal with distribution questions. People would be
most likely to listen and participate if the presenta-
tions focused on the effects of the policies on them.
Second, the effective inclusion of the public would
reinforce the imperative to avoid advocacy of par-
ticular policies. In addition, the increased attention
to distribution questions would, in my judgment,
enhance the attractiveness to legislators of our
work. Too often legislators and their staffs must
wrestle with a blizzard of national aggregate esti-
mates as they try to decipher the important income
and wealth effects of the alternative legislative op-
tions.
Policy Advocacy
The third question focuses on the appropriateness
of publicly supported agricultural economists ad-
vocating policy options. Dealing with this question
requires recognizing that people trained as econo-
mists discharge several different roles in our soci-
ety. Some are simply hired guns. Most of these
people make a very good living. The public expects
(and I hope discounts accordingly) these econo-
mists to say things in favor of policies that will
enhance the income and the wealth andlor organi-
zation prominence of their clients and, in turn,
themselves. Of course, they will, like others in the
advocacy profession, invoke numbers and estimates
that appeal to groups other than their clients. Sel-
dom will they reveal that the policies they advocate
will enhance the income and wealth of their clients.
You can be sure, however, that their clients indeed
realize income, wealth, and organizational benefits.
Otherwise, the services of this group of economists
would not be engaged.
Another group of economists work in the ser-
vice of legislators. Their agenda is set by legislative
events, and surely when these economists make
public utterances, they must recognize the role they
play for the particular legislators to whom they are
responsible, I have the utmost admiration for this
group of economists. They often work under severe
deadlines and great pressures. In appraising their
efforts, it is important to recognize that economists
can make critical contributions to policy decisions
without writing journal articles and giving lectures.
Also, in appraising their contributions, it is im-
portant to recognize that in drafting legislation and
preparing legislative reports, they can do more in
30 minutes to affect policies—and therefore effect
changes in distributions of incomes and wealth—
than most of us accomplish in 30 years of profes-
sional work.
Another group of economists is comprised
of those in the employ of federal and state govern-
ment agencies. Their particular environments vary
widely and relate to their institutional history, lead-
ership, and the policy milieu at any particular time.
Some are in roles similar to other “kept” econo-
mists. Still others seem not under pressure to en-
dorse this or that policy, but are able to discuss rela-
tionships and outcomes of alternative policies,Schertz: Agricultural Policy Analysis: Discussion
especially if they are cautious as to the timing of
their statements.
Still another group of agricultural economists
work in U.S. land-grant universities. Of all the ag-
ricultural economists in the United States, it is this
group that the public would seem to expect to be
policy neutral in their public statements. Yet we ob-
serve prominent members of this group making
statements and signing letters that include prescrip-
tions for policy decisions. It is not clear to me how
they reconcile these endorsements with the reality
that as government employees, they work for all of
the public. The answer may be related to traditional
in-state political realities, including the possibility
of their institution (or themselves individually) be-
ing “captured” by special-interest groups, the effect
of privately financed contracts and endowments,
the invisible strings that are associated with federal
government contracts and special project monies,
as well as views that contrast with mine as to the
appropriateness of such individuals prescribing
particular policies.
There is yet another group of agricultural econ-
omists whose affiliations, and therefore activities,
must be recognized as different. “Nonprofit foun-
dations” employ a number of economists. Techni-
cally these are nonadvocacy groups. But we all
know that this is not the case for most of these insti-
tutions. Therefore, until the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice stops the charade, we have little alternative but
to classify all but a few of these economists the
same as those employed by any for-profit advocacy
group—namely as “kept” economists.
Let me be clear concerning my preference as to
how economists should be expected to handle these
matters. All those economists whose affiliation un-
ambiguously denotes their loyalties to particular in-
terest groups can be expected to freely advocate
whatever in their judgment will maximize their in-
comes and the incomes of their clients. All others,
especially those in land-grant universities and in
nonpolitical positions of other government institu-
tions, should be expected to refrain carefully from
using the word “should” in discussing policy op-
tions—but, instead, focus studiously on comparing
effects of alternative policies, including effects on
income and wealth distribution, without expressing
a personal preference for any policy option. We all
individually have a responsibility to see that advo-
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cacy standards are respected. Our associations can
contribute importantly in these efforts as well.
However, if the contributions to policy making
by those in land-grant universities and in nonpoliti-
cal positions of government institutions are to be
optimized, the leaders of these institutions must ex-
amine how changes in institutional arrangements
can be adjusted to facilitate these contributions to
policy making-the focus of the fourth question
posed here.
Institutional Arrangements
I visualize that a practical system of institutional
arrangements for effective policy analysis that








A public data system that encompasses data
sets for (a) micro farm and nonfarm house-
holds, (b) farm production, (c) national mea-
sures and indicators, and (d) international sta-
tistics which are carefully developed and
maintained.
Estimating models that are regularly reviewed
by peers who do not have a direct stake in the
models or in similar models.
Funding for these activities that is sufficiently
independent, although constrained, to forestall
any suspicions that the activity is designed to
support particular policy options.
Arrangements that facilitate coordination
among investigators in different geographical
locations.
Staffing arrangements that give as much atten-
tion to informing the public as is given to un-
dertaking investigations.
Arrangements that ensure quick responses to
analytical needs as perceived by those directly
involved in the investigations and by the pub-
lic, including legislators.
I place “data system” on the top of the list be-
cause it is an essential input to analyses that deal
with income and wealth distribution. The interna-
tional data base is as important as national mea-
sures and indicators and, in the years ahead, disag-
gregated national data of other countries will have56 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1996
an increasing value and importance to effective
program decision making.
The Economic Research Service has made re-
markable progress, under the leadership of Jim
Johnson, in developing data systems that provide
insights into the economics of U.S. farm production
and of some of the households related to farming.
However, there is much more that is still needed.
One of the institutional difficulties is the attitude of
university agricultural economists toward devoting
their time to these tasks. Too many university
people display a “let the Feds do it—we’ll use the
data after they develop it” attitude.
Such attitudes seem to be cultivated with wide-
spread university reward systems that give priority
to theoretical constructs, and nil (if not negative)
rewards to development of data systems. In the long
run, this kind of reward system undermines the
characteristics that at one time distinguished ag-
ricultural economics departments from economics
departments. Unfortunately, unless the data needs
are confronted, the profession is assigned to a less
than optimum role in supporting policy decision
making. In my view, the usefulness of policy analy-
ses is seriously limited unless they are based on mi-
cro data and analyses that provide insights about
what happens when policies hit the barnyards and
the main streets of rural America.
There is a great deal of attention given at present
to the reasonableness of the estimates generated by
farm-sector estimating models. “~eaking” the
models to adjust out-of-line estimates has become a
common practice. A logical outcome is a central ten-
dency of the estimates emanating from the various
estimating systems. My appeal is that equal effort
should be given to professional reviews of the inner
workings of the estimating models. Might this activ-
ity also be a role for our professional organizations?
Given the probable limitations on funding and
the required complexities of the analytical systems
to confront issues, like income distribution and en-
vironment, we can anticipate that there will be only
a limited number of full-scale national and interna-
tional analytical systems. Further, the systems will
be of such a size that they will be impossible to
develop and maintain by a small number of people.
However, there will be many individuals at scat-
tered locations who, under the appropriate leader-
ship and institutional arrangements, could partici-
pate effectively in the activities.
Conclusion
I conclude that a transformation of our profession’s
approach to agricultural policy would be of sub-
stantial benefit to society as a whole, Such a trans-
formation would include (a) a focus on income and
wealth distribution, (b) attention to the public as a
primary client, (c) avoidance of advocacy, and (d)
adjusting institutions in ways that encourage partic-
ipation in policy analyses including the develop-
ment of data systems.
Some may argue that the goals of this approach
are not achievable. They may contend that farm and
business related groups would abandon supporting
appropriations needed to sustain such a system and
that the leadership of no other group will take an
active interest. Better to avoid the whole issue, they
may suggest, and practice “safe economics’’—fo-
cus on theory or applied work endorsed by particu-
lar interest groups.
Certainly, to attempt a transformation involves
risks. However, for the profession to emphasize
“safe economics” also involves risk. My preference
is to go for a transformation.